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Is "FINAL" REALLY FINAL?
U
Benny Tai*
Recently, the Appeal Committee of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal raised
the question of whether that court had the power to hear an appeal against a decision
of the Court of Appeal. The decision in question concerned a judgment of professional
misconduct against an accountant by a disciplinary committee under the Professional
Accountants Ordinance. The ordinance clearly states that the decision of the Court
of Appeal is final. This article examines whether the Court of Final Appeal has the
constitutional jurisdiction to hear appeals against Court of Appeal decisions. The
author concludes that for appeals that are statutory in nature, if the relevant statute
specifically excludes appeals to the Court of Final Appeal then that court has no
jurisdiction to hear any such appeal.
Introduction
In Peter Chan v Hong Kong Society of Accountants' the Appeal Committee of
the CFA asked rhetorically, "Is 'final' really final?" The case involved an ac-
countant facing a complaint that he had been negligent in the conduct of his
profession under the Professional Accountants Ordinance (PAO).' A disci-
plinary committee found the complaint proven and the accountant was
reprimanded and ordered to pay a penalty to the Hong Kong Society of
Accountants. The accountant appealed to the Court of Appeal, but the ap-
peal was dismissed. He then sought the Court of Appeal's leave to appeal to
the CFA. Based on section 41(2) of the PAO, which provides that "the deci-
sion of the Court of Appeal upon such appeal shall be final", the leave was
refused. The accountant then applied to the CFA for leave to appeal and it
was in this context that the Appeal Committee asked whether final really
was final.
The Appeal Committee seemed to be of the view that the CFA had the
jurisdiction to hear the appeal, although the committee preferred to leave
the question unanswered due to the lack of a full legal argument before it.'
The committee questioned whether the Court of Appeal could prevent the
Associate Professor , Faculty of Law, University of Hong Kong.
1 FAMV No 11 of 2001.
2 Section 34(1)(a)(iv), Cap 50.
3 The Appeal Committee made a similar assumption in an earlier case, A Solicitor v Law Society of Hong
Kong, FAMV No 20 of 2000.
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CFA from correcting errors of law on points of great general or public
importance. It proceeded on the basis that the CFA had the jurisdiction, but
refused leave because the accountant failed to show any reasonable prospect
of success.
In the case, the Court of Appeal did not cite any authority to support its
decision. The Appeal Committee surmised that the decision probably relied
on the Privy Council decision in De Morgan v Director of Social Welfare,4 but
raised doubts about the reasoning of that decision. In that case, the Privy
Council ruled on an appeal against a decision of the New Zealand Court of
Appeal. It decided that on the true construction of a statute which provided
that "the decision of the Court of Appeal shall be final", the only possible
intent of the words was to exclude the remaining right of appeal. The Privy
Council indicated that as the power of the New Zealand legislature to pass
legislation containing such provisions was not challenged, the statute would
effectively exclude any appeal to a court of final appeal.
The Privy Council decision provided that the CFA might have jurisdic-
tion to hear the appeal by challenging the authority of the legislature to make
such a statutory provision. If the statute was unconstitutional then the CFA
would have jurisdiction. However, the Appeal Committee of the CFA noted
that the Privy Council did not mention how the power of the legislature to
pass such legislation could be challenged.
Constitutional Provisions of the Basic Law
The constitutional question was not addressed in De Morgan. Moreover, the
constitutional setting of New Zealand is totally different from that of Hong
Kong.' Hence, the ruling has no reference value and the situation in Peter
Chan v Hong Kong Society of Accountants must be examined with regard to
Hong Kong's specific constitutional setting.
The Basic Law is the constitution of the HKSAR. Article 11 of the Basic
Law provides that no law which is enacted by the legislature of the HKSAR
shall contravene the Basic Law. If any legislation does contravene the Basic
Law then that legislation will be invalidated. However, in terms of constitu-
tional challenge under the Basic Law, the question whether the Basic Law
4 [1998] AC 275. Two petitioners sought special leave of the Privy Council to appeal to the Judicial
Committee against decisions of the New Zealand Court of Appeal. The relevant legislation provided
that the decision of the Court of Appeal was "final".
5 The power to give special leave to appeal was a prerogative power and required express words to be
limited or abolished. However, this power is no longer a normal prerogative power of the Crown
since the passage of the Judicial Committee Acts 1833 and 1844, and the Statute of Westminster
1931 and its adoption in New Zealand by the Statute of Westminster Adoption Act 1947. It is now
enough for the limitation or abolition to be shown by either express words or necessary intendment.
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grants the CFA the jurisdiction to hear all appeals against the decisions of the
Court of Appeal, even when a statute expressly states that a particular deci-
sion is final, must be examined. If the CFAs jurisdiction can be established in
this way, then the statute is overruled by the constitutional provision that
grants jurisdiction to the CFA. Therefore, the provisions of the Basic Law
must be examined to ascertain whether any provision explicitly or implicitly
grants the CFA the jurisdiction to hear appeals against every decision of the
Court of Appeal.
The first is Article 19 of the Basic Law which provides that HKSAR courts
have jurisdiction over all cases in the HKSAR with the exception of the
restrictions which are imposed on that jurisdiction by the legal system and
the maintenance of principles that were previously in force in Hong Kong.'
Hence, Article 19 does not specify which court must exercise jurisdiction
over a particular case in the first instance, which court must hear subsequent
appeals or how many appeals are allowed. What Article 19 determines is that
if a case reaches the CFA, the CFA will have the authority to hear it. This is
because it is safe to assume that if a lower court has jurisdiction over a case
according to the Basic Law, the CFA, as the highest court in the HKSAR,
must also have jurisdiction over that case. However, it does not clearly indi-
cate that the CFA has the authority to hear all cases.
Article 84 of the Basic Law further provides that HKSAR courts shall
adjudicate cases in accordance with the laws that are applicable in the HKSAR
and can refer to precedents of other common law jurisdictions. The laws that
are applicable in the HKSAR include the Basic Law, the common law and
ordinances that are enacted by the Legislative Council.' Are there other pro-
visions of the Basic Law, the common law or any ordinances that support the
jurisdiction of the CFA to hear all appeals?
Articles 2 and 19 of the Basic Law provide that the HKSAR enjoys the
power of final adjudication.' Article 82 of the Basic Law provides that this
power is vested in the CFA. Hence, the legal basis of the CFA jurisdiction to
hear appeals is not derived from common law, but from the Basic Law. The
question is whether the vesting of the power of final adjudication to the CFA
actually grants it the power to hear every appeal.
6 For detailed discussion of the courts of the HKSAR, see Benny Tai, "The Jurisdiction of the Courts of
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region," in Alice Lee (ed), Law Lectures for Practitioners
1998 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Law Journal Ltd, 1998), p 6 5 .
7 Under Art 18 of the Basic Law, the laws that are applicable in the HKSAR include the Basic Law,
the laws previously in force in Hong Kong as provided for in Art 8 of the Basic Law, and the laws
enacted by the legislature of the HKSAR. Under Art 8, common law, rules of equity, ordinances,
subordinate legislation and customary law that does not contravene the Basic Law are laws that were
previously in force in Hong Kong.
8 Arts 2 and 19 of the Basic Law of the HKSAR.
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In Peter Chan v Hong Kong Society of Accountants, it seemed to be the view
of the Appeal Committee of the CFA that the CFA had the power to correct
errors of law on points of great general or public importance. However, the
basis on which the Appeal Committee made this claim is not clear. One
possibility is the constitutional provision that vests the power of final adjudi-
cation in the CFA. However, the Appeal Committee would have needed to
read much into the provision to support such an interpretation. The Basic
Law merely states that the HKSAR enjoys the power of final adjudication
and that the CFA will exercise that power on behalf of the HKSAR. The
CFA does not derive powers for itself from this provision. To claim that the
CFA has the power to hear all appeals on the basis of its power of final adju-
dication expands the provision from merely regulating the relationship
between the systems in the HKSAR and mainland China to regulating the
relationship between two internal organs of the HKSAR: the CFA and the
Legislative Council. The context of granting the HKSAR the power of final
adjudication is meant to reflect the high degree of autonomy that is enjoyed
by Hong Kong in that local appeals do not go to the courts in mainland
China. Unless further support can be found from the statutory context or
common law, any other interpretation does not have a firm foundation.
Statutory Provisions
If the provisions of the Basic Law by themselves cannot provide authority to
the CFA to hear appeals of all cases, then whether any provision in an
ordinance can provide such authority directly, or at least provide a context
in which the constitutional provision can be interpreted, must be considered.
Such a provision will only be valid when there is no contradiction between
it and the Basic Law. As illustrated above, the constitutional provisions
seem to be silent on whether the CFA has the authority to hear appeals in
all cases. The jurisdiction of the CFA and the power to hear appeals
are provided in the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance
(HKCFAO). 9 Section 4 of the HKCFAO provides that the CFA has the
jurisdiction to hear appeals conferred on it under the HKCFAO and by any
other law. A party can apply to the Court of Appeal or the CFA for leave to
appeal to the CFA.10 Under the HKCFAO, criminal causes or matters are
appealable to the CFA at its discretion from any final decision of the Court
of Appeal." In any civil cause or matter, certain appeals to the CFA are
9 Cap 484.
10 Sections 23 and 24, Cap 484.
1 Section 32, Cap 484. Appeals to the CFA can also be heard at its discretion from any final decision
of the Court of First Instance (not being a verdict or finding of a jury) from which no appeal lies to
the Court of Appeal.
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appealable to the CFA as of right.12 Section 22(1)(b) of the HKCFAO pro-
vides that:
"An appeal shall lie to the Court [the CFA] in any civil cause or matter ...
at the discretion of the Court of Appeal or the Court from any other
judgment of the Court of Appeal in any civil cause or matter, whether
final or interlocutory, if, in the opinion of the Court of Appeal or the
Court, as the case my be, the question involved in the appeal is one which,
by reason of its great general or public importance, or otherwise, ought to
be submitted to the Court for decision ... "1
It seems that this provision may give the CFA the power to hear all
appeals against decisions of the Court of Appeal in civil cases. In civil causes
or matters, the CFA can decide by itself whether the question which was
considered in the judgment of the Court of Appeal is of great general or pub-
lic importance and hence should be submitted to the CFA for decision. The
CFA can then use this discretionary power to decide that an error of law
which was committed by the Court of Appeal is on a point of great general or
public importance, and that it has the jurisdiction to hear the appeal even
when the relevant statute states that the decision of the Court of Appeal is
final. However, the provision is not a constitutional provision and cannot
affect subsequent legislation. Indeed, the PAO" was enacted before the
HKCFAO,15 and it is arguable that section 41(2) of the PAO was overruled
by section 22(1)(b) of the HKCFAO at the time of its enactment. However,
this is not the only possible interpretation of section 22(1)(b).
If the wider statutory context is considered, then the meaning of section
22(1)(b) may not necessarily be that plain. The PAO is an ordinance that
provides for the registration and control of the accounting profession. The
ordinance has provisions to maintain professional standards and allows com-
plaints of professional misconduct against accountants. 6 There are other
ordinances that govern the registration and control of other professions, all
of which include provisions to maintain professional standards that allow
12 Section 22(1)(a), Cap 484. When the matter in dispute on the appeal of the final judgment of the
Court of Appeal in any civil cause or matter amounts to the value of $1,000,000 or more, or when the
appeal involves, directly or indirectly, a claim with respect to property or a civil right amounting to
the value of $1,000,000 or more, a party may as of right appeal to the CFA.
13 Moreover, the CFA can allow an appeal against a decision of the Court of First Instance made under
or related to the Chief Executive Election Ordinance (Cap 569). (See also s 2 2 (1)(c), Cap 484.)
14 The PAO was enacted in 1973.
15 The HKCFAO was enacted in 1995 and came into effect on 1 July 1997. Minor amendments to s 22
were made in 2001.
16 Part V of the PAO. The case in question was an appeal against the decision of the Court of Appeal
concerning the appeal against a decision of the disciplinary committee that was made under the
provisions of the PAO.
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complaints against professional misconduct. Some of these ordinances, like
the PAO, were enacted before the HKCFAO,"7 but others were enacted after
the HKCFAO." These ordinances use similar schemes to deal with disciplin-
ary matters in the professions. A disciplinary body is responsible for hearing
complaints against members of the profession, and any member of the profes-
sion who is complained against has a right to appeal against the ruling of the
disciplinary body. In some of the ordinances, appeals against the decisions of
the disciplinary bodies must go to the Court of Appeal." In other ordinances,
appeals must go to the Court of First Instance,20 and still others to a tribunal
that has been established under the statute.21 In all of these instances, regard-
less of whether the appellate body is the Court of Appeal, the Court
of First Instance or a tribunal, the decision of the appellate body is stipulated
as final.
If the meaning of section 22(1)(b) of the HKCFA is interpreted to give
the CFA the power to override section 41(2) of the PAO, then two absurd
results would be created. Firstly, if the interpretation is correct, then the CFA
can hear appeals against Court of Appeal decisions in relation to the rulings
of the disciplinary bodies of some, but not all, professional organisations. This
would depend on whether the statute that covers the registration of the mem-
bers of the professional body was enacted before or after 1 July 1997, the date
of the enactment of the HKCFAO. Secondly, the CFA would have no juris-
diction to hear such appeals should the appeal against the ruling of the
disciplinary body of a professional organisation have been heard by the Court
of First Instance or a tribunal that was established under that statute to hear
appeals. A lower court, or even a tribunal, could be exempted from the appel-
late jurisdiction of the CFA, but the Court of Appeal would not.
There is no rational ground on which to justify such distinctions in the
CFAs jurisdiction over rulings made by professional bodies, all of which use
comparable schemes to deal with disciplinary matters and appeals. As there is
no such express wording in the HKCFAO, it is inconsistent with the wider
17 The Medical Registration Ordinance (Cap 161) was enacted in 1957; the Legal Practitioners Ordi-
nance (Cap 159) was enacted in 1964; the Pharmacy and Poisons Ordinance (Cap 138) was enacted
in 1970; the Pilotage Ordinance (Cap 84) was enacted in 1971; the Engineers Registration Ordi-
nance (Cap 409) was enacted in 1990; the Travel Agents Ordinance (Cap 218) was enacted in 1985;
the Social Workers Registration Ordinance (Cap 505) was enacted on 6 June 1997, only days before
the HKCFAO came into force.
1 The Estate Agents Ordinance (Cap 511) was enacted in 1998; the Chinese Medicine Ordinance
(Cap 549) was enacted in 1999; the Housing Managers Registration Ordinance (Cap 550) was
enacted in 1999.
19 Section 26, the Medical Registration Ordinance (Cap 161); s 13 and s 37B, the Legal Practitioners
Ordinance (Cap 159); s 28, the Engineers Registration Ordinance (Cap 409); s 33, the Social Work-
ers Registration Ordinance (Cap 505); s 28, the Housing Managers Registration Ordinance (Cap
550) and s 103, the Chinese Medicine Ordinance (Cap 549).
20 Section 20, the Pilotage Ordinance (Cap 84); s 16, the Pharmacy and Poisons Ordinance (Cap 138).
21 Section 30, the Travel Agents Ordinance (Cap 218); s 32 , the Estate Agents Ordinance (Cap 511).
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statutory context to override the power of the Court of Appeal to make con-
clusive decisions on appeals against the rulings of the disciplinary bodies in
these statutes, including the PAO.
Another issue is that the CFA only has the power to hear all appeals against
judgments of the Court of Appeal in cases of civil cause or matter. There is
serious doubt as to whether the judgment made by the Court of Appeal in
hearing appeals against the ruling of a disciplinary committee under the PAO
is a judgment in a civil cause or matter. The civil jurisdiction22 of the courts
cover actions in personam and actions in rem. Actions in personam are inter
partes actions concerning the settlement of the rights of the parties between
themselves. An example is an action for damages for breach of contract or in
a tort case. Actions in rem are actions brought to vindicate a right, such as
ownership, that is available against all persons. 23 The nature of a disciplinary
hearing under a statute that regulates a professional body does not fall under
either of the heads of the civil jurisdiction of HKSAR courts. The disciplin-
ary hearing is based in statute.24 If there is any appeal against a disciplinary
ruling, then it can also only be based in statute. There is no right to appeal
under common law." If the statute on which the disciplinary hearing is based
states that the decision of the Court of Appeal is final, then there is no other
legal basis for the CFA to override the statutory provision. Appeals from dis-
ciplinary hearings are simply not "appeals in civil cause or matter".
On the basis of this analysis, section 41(2) of the HKCFAO neither pro-
vides the direct legal authority for, nor a context for interpretation of, the
constitutional provisions for the CFA to hear appeals in all cases. As already
mentioned, the wider statutory context points to the same conclusion.
Common Law
If the statute cannot provide the authority or context then the question is
whether the common law can provide such authority must be considered. As
illustrated above, there is no right to appeal in disciplinary hearings in the
common law. The courts do enjoy inherent jurisdiction over cases and it is
already well accepted that they have the inherent power to correct any error
of law, jurisdictional error or not, that is committed by administrative bodies
22 The civil jurisdiction of the courts of the HKSAR can be divided into the private law jurisdiction
and public law jurisdiction. The private law jurisdiction is mentioned here. The public law jurisdic-
tion to review administrative actions and decisions is described in the following part on "common
law"
23 For a full explanation, see Tai (n 6 above), pp 78-80.
24 Brian Harris, The Law and Practice of Disciplinary and Regulatory Proceedings (Chichester, England:
Barry Rose Law Publishers Ltd, 2nd edn, 1999), pp 1-4.
25 Ibid., p 3 2 2 .
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in the form of review.26 However, the courts are not amenable to reviewing
errors of law that are committed by other courts in making decisions under
statutes that do not go to jurisdiction.2 7 The common law rule in this area
does not help our case very much. Firstly, it is concerned with the review of
administrative decisions but not with appeals against administrative decisions.
The basis of the inherent jurisdiction of a court is to review an error of law to
allow it to enforce the law. This is very different from the power to hear
appeals, which is about the merits and not the vires of the case. Secondly,
even in review, the common law rule does not challenge a statutory provision
which expressly states that a decision of an inferior court is final. Inferior
courts are recognised as having the power to conclusively decide a point of
law when it is on an issue within their jurisdictions. This is even more diffi-
cult in a case of appeal, especially when the court's jurisdiction is based on
statute.
The other source of inherent jurisdiction can be that claimed by the CFA
in Ng Ka Ling v Director of Immigration (No 2).8 In that case, the CFA added
further explanation to a judgment that it had previously given explaining the
basis of its inherent jurisdiction. It neither quoted an authority nor the con-
stitutional framework to support its power to issue the explanation after its
decision. The CFA admitted that clarifying its judgment on an application
by one of the parties of the original judgment was exceptional, but justified
this action by claiming that the nature of the matter was of great constitutional,
public and general importance and that the original judgment had given rise
to much controversy. Even then the CFA faced serious criticism that it had
claimed inherent jurisdiction without explanation or authority.29
Even if the inherent jurisdiction in Ng Ka Ling v Director of Immigration
(No 2) can be justified, the nature of the jurisdiction in this case is very
different. The concern of Ng Ka Ling v Director of Immigration (No 2) was the
finality of judgment, but the concern in this case is how an error of law of a
lower court can be corrected. Moreover, the earlier case involved no great
constitutional, public or general importance. The scope and limit of such
inherent jurisdiction and the extent to which it can accommodate the power
to correct errors of law that are committed by courts in the form of appeal is
not clear. Unless we take the extreme view that the CFA enjoys unfettered
jurisdiction to decide whatever matters it considers desirable, its claim of in-
herent jurisdiction is not justifiable. Therefore, the common law rule on the
26 Wade and Forsyth, Administrative Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 8th edn, 2000), pp 33-34.
See Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission [19691 2 AC 147.
27 R v Hull University Visitors ex parte Page [19931 AC 682.
28 11999] 1 HKLRD 577.
29 Johannes M. M. Chan, "What the Court of Appeal has not Clarified in its Clarification: Jurisdiction
and Amicus Intervention," in Chan, Fu and Ghai (eds), Hong Kong's Constitutional Debate: Conflict
over Interpretation (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2000).
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inherent jurisdiction of the courts of the HKSAR, like the statutes, cannot
by itself grant the CFA the power to hear appeals in all cases, nor can it
provide a context to interpret the provision of the Basic Law to grant such a
power to the CFA.
Conclusion
Though the Appeal Committee of the CFA suggested that the CFA had the
jurisdiction to hear all appeals against the decisions of the Court of Appeal
on the ground that it had the power to correct any error of law on points of
great general or public importance, this is not supported by the Basic Law,
the HKCFAO or the common law. The decision of the Court of Appeal must
be taken as final, as stated by the statute. In this sense, therefore, "final" is
indeed final.
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